Paper 2023/1596

A Black Box Attack Using Side Channel Analysis and Hardware Trojans

Raja Adhithan Radhakrishnan, Society of Electronic Transactions and Security
Abstract

The emergence of hardware trojans as significant threats in various aspects of hardware design, including Firmware, open-source IP, and PCB design, has raised serious concerns. Simultaneously, AI technologies have been employed to simplify the complexity of Side Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks. Due to the increasing risk posed by these threats, it becomes essential to test hardware by considering all possible attack vectors. This paper aims to propose a black box attack using side channel analysis with the aid of hardware trojan insertion. The objective is to emphasize the necessity of side channel-based testing to defend against such attacks. The proposed attack can be executed in FPGA, ASIC, and microcontroller designs. The paper is primarily focused on Verilog design based hardware trojan insertion, and a small example demonstration is provided to illustrate this attack. Keywords:

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Side-channel attacksHardware trojanBlack box attack.
Contact author(s)
r rajaadhithan @ gmail com
History
2023-10-17: approved
2023-10-16: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1596
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1596,
      author = {Raja Adhithan Radhakrishnan},
      title = {A Black Box Attack Using Side Channel Analysis and Hardware Trojans},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1596},
      year = {2023},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1596}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1596}
}
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