Paper 2023/1535

A Total Break of the 3WISE Digital Signature Scheme

Daniel Smith-Tone, National Institute of Standards and Technology, University of Louisville
Abstract

A new batch of ``complete and proper'' digital signature scheme submissions has recently been published by NIST as part of its process for establishing post-quantum cryptographic standards. This note communicates an attack on the 3WISE digital signature scheme that the submitters did not wish to withdraw after NIST communicated it to them. While the 3WISE digital signature scheme is based on a collection of cubic maps which are naturally modeled as symmetric 3-tensors and 3-tensor rank is a difficult problem, the multivariate signature scheme is still vulnerable to MinRank attacks upon projection. We are able to break the NIST security level I parameters within a few seconds. Since the attack is polynomial time, there is no reparametrization resulting in a secure scheme.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Multivariate CryptographyMinRankCryptanalysis
Contact author(s)
daniel smith @ nist gov
History
2023-10-09: approved
2023-10-07: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1535
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1535,
      author = {Daniel Smith-Tone},
      title = {A Total Break of the {3WISE} Digital Signature Scheme},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1535},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1535}
}
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