A note on ``authenticated key agreement protocols for dew-assisted IoT systems''

Zhengjun Cao; Lihua Liu

Paper 2023/1497

A note on ``authenticated key agreement protocols for dew-assisted IoT systems''

Zhengjun Cao

Lihua Liu

Abstract

We show that the key agreement scheme [J. Supercomput., 78:12093-12113, 2022] is flawed. (1) It neglects the representation of a point over an elliptic curve and the basic requirement for bit-wise XOR, which results in a trivial equality. By the equality, an adversary can recover a target device's identity, which means the scheme fails to keep anonymity. (2) It falsely requires that the central server should share its master secret key with each dew server. (3) The specified certificate is almost nonsensical.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info: Preprint.
Keywords: Authentication Key agreement Dew computing Certificate Anonymity
Contact author(s): caozhj @ shu edu cn
liulh @ shmtu edu cn
History: 2023-10-03: approved; 2023-10-01: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2023/1497
License: CC0

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1497,
      author = {Zhengjun Cao and Lihua Liu},
      title = {A note on ``authenticated key agreement protocols for dew-assisted IoT systems''},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1497},
      year = {2023},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1497}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1497}
}