Paper 2023/1497
A note on ``authenticated key agreement protocols for dew-assisted IoT systems''
Abstract
We show that the key agreement scheme [J. Supercomput., 78:12093-12113, 2022] is flawed. (1) It neglects the representation of a point over an elliptic curve and the basic requirement for bit-wise XOR, which results in a trivial equality. By the equality, an adversary can recover a target device's identity, which means the scheme fails to keep anonymity. (2) It falsely requires that the central server should share its master secret key with each dew server. (3) The specified certificate is almost nonsensical.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- AuthenticationKey agreementDew computingCertificateAnonymity
- Contact author(s)
-
caozhj @ shu edu cn
liulh @ shmtu edu cn - History
- 2023-10-03: approved
- 2023-10-01: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1497
- License
-
CC0
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1497,
author = {Zhengjun Cao and Lihua Liu},
title = {A note on ``authenticated key agreement protocols for dew-assisted {IoT} systems''},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1497},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1497}
}
