Paper 2023/1472

Naysayer proofs

István András Seres, Eötvös Loránd University
Noemi Glaeser, University of Maryland, College Park, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy
Joseph Bonneau, a16z crypto research, New York University
Abstract

This work introduces the notion of naysayer proofs. We observe that in numerous (zero-knowledge) proof systems, it is significantly more efficient for the verifier to be convinced by a so-called naysayer that a false proof is invalid than it is to check that a genuine proof is valid. We show that every NP language has constant-size and constant-time naysayer proofs. We also show practical constructions for several example proof systems, including FRI polynomial commitments, post-quantum secure digital signatures, and verifiable shuffles. Naysayer proofs enable an interesting new optimistic verification mode potentially suitable for resource-constrained verifiers, such as smart contracts.

Note: We addressed an issue in our main theorem.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2024
Keywords
proof systemzero-knowledgesoundnessblockchainsmart contract
Contact author(s)
seresistvanandras @ gmail com
nglaeser @ umd edu
jbonneau @ gmail com
History
2024-03-14: last of 2 revisions
2023-09-25: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1472
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1472,
      author = {István András Seres and Noemi Glaeser and Joseph Bonneau},
      title = {Naysayer proofs},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1472},
      year = {2023},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1472}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1472}
}
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