Everlasting ROBOT: the Marvin Attack

Hubert Kario

Paper 2023/1442

Everlasting ROBOT: the Marvin Attack

Hubert Kario

, Red Hat

Abstract

In this paper we show that Bleichenbacher-style attacks on RSA decryption are not only still possible, but also that vulnerable implementations are common. We have successfully attacked multiple implementations using only timing of decryption operation and shown that many others are vulnerable. To perform the attack we used more statistically rigorous techniques like the sign test, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, and bootstrapping of median of pairwise differences. We publish a set of tools for testing libraries that perform RSA decryption against timing side-channel attacks, including one that can test arbitrary TLS servers with no need to write a test harnesses. Finally, we propose a set of workarounds that implementations can employ if they can't avoid the use of RSA.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info: Preprint.
Keywords: side-channel attacks timing attacks Bleichenbacher attack RSA
Contact author(s): hkario @ redhat com
History: 2023-09-24: approved; 2023-09-21: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2023/1442
License: CC BY-SA

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1442,
      author = {Hubert Kario},
      title = {Everlasting {ROBOT}: the Marvin Attack},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1442},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1442}
}