Paper 2023/142

On the Feasibility of Single-Trace Attacks on the Gaussian Sampler using a CDT

Soundes Marzougui, Technische Universität Belrin
Ievgan Kabin, IHP - Leibniz-Institut für innovative Mikroelektronik
Juliane Krämer, University of Regensburg
Thomas Aulbach, University of Regensburg
Jean-Pierre Seifert, Technical University of Berlin

We present a single-trace attack against lattice-based KEMs using the cumulative distribution table for Gaussian sampling and execute it in a real-world environment. Our analysis takes a single power trace of the decapsulation algorithm as input and exploits leakage of the Gaussian sampling subroutine to reveal the session key. We investigated the feasibility of the attack on different boards and proved that the power consumption traces become less informative with higher clock frequencies. Therefore, we introduce a machine-learning denoising technique, which enhances the accuracy of our attack and leverages its success rate to 100%. We accomplish the attack on FrodoKEM, a lattice-based KEM and third-round alternate candidate. We execute it on a Cortex-M4 board equipped with an STM32F4 micro-controller clocked at different frequencies.

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Publication info
FrodoKEMGaussian samplerMachine-LearningPost-quantum cryptographyPower analysisSide-channel analysis
Contact author(s)
soundes marzougui @ tu-berlin de
kabin @ ihp-microelectronics com
juliane kraemer @ ur de
thomas aulbach @ ur de
Jean-Pierre Seifert @ external telekom de
2023-02-15: approved
2023-02-06: received
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      author = {Soundes Marzougui and Ievgan Kabin and Juliane Krämer and Thomas Aulbach and Jean-Pierre Seifert},
      title = {On the Feasibility of Single-Trace Attacks on the Gaussian Sampler using a {CDT}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/142},
      year = {2023},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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