Paper 2023/1419
Improving the Rectangle Attack on GIFT-64
Abstract
GIFT is a family of lightweight block ciphers based on SPN structure and composed of two versions named GIFT-64 and GIFT-128. In this paper, we reevaluate the security of GIFT-64 against the rectangle attack under the related-key setting. Investigating the previous rectangle key recovery attack on GIFT-64, we obtain the core idea of improving the attack——trading off the time complexity of each attack phase. We flexibly guess part of the involved subkey bits to balance the time cost of each phase so that the overall time complexity of the attack is reduced. Moreover, the reused subkey bits are identified according to the linear key schedule of GIFT-64 and bring additional advantages for our attacks. Furthermore, we incorporate the above ideas and propose a dedicated MILP model for finding the best rectangle key recovery attack on GIFT-64. As a result, we get the improved rectangle attacks on 26-round GIFT-64, which are the best attacks on it in terms of time complexity so far.
Note: This version only adds Publication Information compared to the version submitted on 20 September 2023.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. Selected Areas in Cryptography 2023
- Keywords
- symmetric cryptographyGIFT-64rectangle attackkey recovery attackrelated-key scenariokey guessing strategy
- Contact author(s)
-
icsnow98 @ gmail com
zhangnana @ iie ac cn
xyljnu @ gmail com
songling qs @ gmail com
yangqianqian @ iie ac cn
hhfzhfzh @ 163 com - History
- 2023-09-24: revised
- 2023-09-20: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1419
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1419,
author = {Yincen Chen and Nana Zhang and Xuanyu Liang and Ling Song and Qianqian Yang and Zhuohui Feng},
title = {Improving the Rectangle Attack on GIFT-64},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1419},
year = {2023},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1419}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1419}
}
