Paper 2023/1336
Riggs: Decentralized Sealed-Bid Auctions
Abstract
We introduce the first practical protocols for fully decentralized sealed-bid auctions using timed commitments. Timed commitments ensure that the auction is finalized fairly even if all participants drop out after posting bids or if $n-1$ bidders collude to try to learn the $n^{th}$ bidder’s bid value. Our protocols rely on a novel non-malleable timed commitment scheme which efficiently supports range proofs to establish that bidders have sufficient funds to cover a hidden bid value. This allows us to penalize users who abandon bids for exactly the bid value, while supporting simultaneous bidding in multiple auctions with a shared collateral pool. Our protocols are concretely efficient and we have implemented them in an Ethereum- compatible smart contract which automatically enforces payment and delivery of an auctioned digital asset.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. ACM CCS 2023
- DOI
- 10.1145/3576915.3623182
- Keywords
- auctionstimed commitmentsrange proofsblockchains
- Contact author(s)
- nirvan tyagi @ gmail com
- History
- 2023-09-08: approved
- 2023-09-07: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1336
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1336, author = {Nirvan Tyagi and Arasu Arun and Cody Freitag and Riad Wahby and Joseph Bonneau and David Mazières}, title = {Riggs: Decentralized Sealed-Bid Auctions}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1336}, year = {2023}, doi = {10.1145/3576915.3623182}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1336} }