Paper 2023/1318
Two-Round Threshold Lattice Signatures from Threshold Homomorphic Encryption
Abstract
Much recent work has developed efficient protocols for threshold signatures, where $n$ parties share a signing key and some threshold $t$ of those parties must interact to produce a signature. Yet efficient threshold signatures with post-quantum security have been elusive, with the state-of-the-art being a two-round scheme by Damgård et al. based on lattices that support only the full threshold case (i.e., $t=n$). We show here a two-round threshold signature scheme based on standard lattice assumptions that support arbitrary thresholds $t\leq n$. Estimates of our scheme's performance at the $128$-bit security level with a trusted setup show that in the $3$-out-of-$5$ case, we obtain signatures of size $11.5$ KB and public keys of size $13.6$ KB, with an execution of the signing protocol using roughly $1.5$ MB of communication per party. We achieve improved parameters if only a small bounded number of signatures are ever issued with the same key. As an essential building block and independent contribution, we construct a maliciously secure threshold (linearly) homomorphic encryption scheme that supports arbitrary thresholds $t \leq n$.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Lattice-Based CryptographyThreshold SignaturesThreshold Homomorphic EncryptionZero-Knowledge Proofs
- Contact author(s)
-
dgur1 @ cs umd edu
jkatz2 @ gmail com
tjerand silde @ ntnu no - History
- 2023-09-08: approved
- 2023-09-04: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1318
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1318, author = {Kamil Doruk Gur and Jonathan Katz and Tjerand Silde}, title = {Two-Round Threshold Lattice Signatures from Threshold Homomorphic Encryption}, howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1318}, year = {2023}, note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1318}}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1318} }