Paper 2023/1196

A New Paradigm for Verifiable Secret Sharing

Sourav Das, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
Zhuolun Xiang, Aptos
Alin Tomescu, Aptos
Alexander Spiegelman, Aptos
Benny Pinkas, Aptos
Ling Ren, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) is a fundamental building block in cryptography. Despite its importance and extensive studies, existing VSS protocols are often complex and inefficient. Many of them do not support dual threads, are not publicly verifiable, or do not properly terminate in asynchronous networks. In this paper, we present a new and simple paradigm for designing VSS protocols in synchronous and asynchronous networks. Our VSS protocols are optimally fault-tolerant, i.e., they tolerate a 1/2 and a 1/3 fraction of malicious nodes in synchronous and asynchronous networks, respectively. They only require a public key infrastructure and the hardness of discrete logarithms. Our protocols support dual thresholds and their transcripts are publicly verifiable. We implement our VSS protocols and measure their computation and communication costs with up to 1024 nodes. Our evaluation illustrates that our VSS protocols provide asynchronous termination and public verifiability with minimum performance overhead. Compared to the existing VSS protocol with similar guarantees, our protocols are 5-15× and 8-13× better in computation and communication cost, respectively.

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Verifiable Secret SharingThreshold Cryptography
Contact author(s)
souravd2 @ illinois edu
xiangzhuolun @ gmail com
tomescu alin @ gmail com
sasha spiegelman @ gmail com
benny @ pinkas net
renling @ illinois edu
2023-08-07: approved
2023-08-06: received
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      author = {Sourav Das and Zhuolun Xiang and Alin Tomescu and Alexander Spiegelman and Benny Pinkas and Ling Ren},
      title = {A New Paradigm for Verifiable Secret Sharing},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1196},
      year = {2023},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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