Benchmarking the Setup of Updatable zk-SNARKs

Karim Baghery; Axel Mertens; Mahdi Sedaghat

Paper 2023/1161

Benchmarking the Setup of Updatable zk-SNARKs

Karim Baghery

, COSIC, KU Leuven

Axel Mertens

, COSIC, KU Leuven

Mahdi Sedaghat

, COSIC, KU Leuven

Abstract

Subversion-resistant zk-SNARKs allow the provers to verify the Structured Reference String (SRS), via an SRS Verification (SV) algorithm and bypass the need for a Trusted Third Party (TTP). Pairing-based zk-SNARKs with \(updatable\) and \(universal\) SRS are an extension of subversion-resistant ones which additionally allow the verifiers to update the SRS, via an SRS Updating (SU) algorithm, and similarly bypass the need for a TTP. In this paper, we examine the setup of these zk-SNARKs by benchmarking the efficiency of the SV and SU algorithms within the \(\textsf{Arkworks}\) library. The benchmarking covers a range of updatable zk-SNARKs, including Sonic, Plonk, Marlin, Lunar, and Basilisk. Our analysis reveals that relying solely on the standard Algebraic Group Model (AGM) may not be sufficient in practice, and we may need a model with weaker assumptions. Specifically, we find that while Marlin is secure in the AGM, additional elements need to be added to its SRS to formally prove certain security properties in the updatable CRS model. We demonstrate that the SV algorithms become inefficient for mid-sized circuits with over 20,000 multiplication gates and 100 updates. To address this, we introduce Batched SV algorithms (BSV) that leverage standard batching techniques and offer significantly improved performance. As a tool, we propose an efficient verification approach that allows the parties to identify a malicious SRS updater with logarithmic verification in the number of updates. In the case of Basilisk, for a circuit with \(2^{20}\) multiplication gates, a \(1000\)-time updated SRS can be verified in less than 30 sec, a malicious updater can be identified in less than 4 min (improvable by pre-computation), and each update takes less than 6 min.

Note: This is the full version of the Latincrypt 2023 paper.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Major revision. Latincrypt 2023: International Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America
Contact author(s): baghery karim @ gmail com
axel mertens @ kuleuven be
ssedagha @ esat kuleuven be
History: 2023-07-30: approved; 2023-07-27: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2023/1161
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1161,
      author = {Karim Baghery and Axel Mertens and Mahdi Sedaghat},
      title = {Benchmarking the Setup of Updatable zk-SNARKs},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1161},
      year = {2023},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1161}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1161}
}