Paper 2023/114
Credible, Optimal Auctions via Blockchains
Abstract
Akbarpour and Li (2020) formalized credibility as an auction desideratum where the auctioneer cannot benefit by implementing undetectable deviations from the promised auction and showed that, in the plain model, the ascending price auction with reserves is the only credible, strategyproof, revenue-optimal auction. Ferreira and Weinberg (2020) proposed the Deferred Revelation Auction (DRA) as a communication efficient auction that avoids the uniqueness results from (2020) assuming the existence of cryptographic commitments and as long as bidder valuations are MHR. They also showed DRA is not credible in settings where bidder valuations are
Metadata
- Available format(s)
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PDF
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- auctionsblockchainscredibilitycommitments
- Contact author(s)
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tarun @ gauntlet network
matheus @ seas harvard edu
ksk @ eecs berkeley edu - History
- 2023-01-30: approved
- 2023-01-30: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/114
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/114, author = {Tarun Chitra and Matheus V. X. Ferreira and Kshitij Kulkarni}, title = {Credible, Optimal Auctions via Blockchains}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/114}, year = {2023}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/114} }