Paper 2023/1135

HaMAYO: A Fault-Tolerant Reconfigurable Hardware Implementation of the MAYO Signature Scheme

Oussama Sayari, Technische Universität Berlin
Soundes Marzougui, Technical University of Berlin, STMicroelectronics (Belgium)
Thomas Aulbach, University of Regensburg
Juliane Krämer, University of Regensburg
Jean-Pierre Seifert, Technical University of Berlin, Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology
Abstract

MAYO is a topical modification of the established multivariate signature scheme UOV. Signer and Verifier locally enlarge the public key map, such that the dimension of the oil space and therefore, the parameter sizes in general, can be reduced. This significantly reduces the public key size while maintaining the appealing properties of UOV, like short signatures and fast verification. Therefore, MAYO is considered as an attractive candidate in the NIST call for additional digital signatures and might be an adequate solution for real-world deployment in resource-constrained devices. When emerging to hardware implementation of multivariate schemes and specifically MAYO, different challenges are faced, namely resource utilization, which scales up with higher parameter sets. To accommodate this, we introduce a configurable hardware implementation designed for integration across various FPGA architectures. Our approach features adaptable configurations aligned with NIST-defined security levels and incorporates resources optimization modules. Our implementation is specifically tested on the Zynq ZedBoard with the Zynq-7020 SoC, with performance evaluations and comparisons made against previous hardware implementations of multivariate schemes. Furthermore, we conducted a security analysis of the MAYO implementation highlighting potential physical attacks and implemented lightweight countermeasures.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
Keywords
MAYOMultivariate CryptographyPost-Quantum CryptographyDigital SignatureHardware Implementation
Contact author(s)
oussama_sayari @ yahoo fr
soundes marzougui @ st com
Thomas Aulbach @ informatik uni-regensburg de
juliane kraemer @ ur de
jean-pierre seifert @ tu-berlin de
History
2024-02-23: last of 2 revisions
2023-07-20: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1135
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1135,
      author = {Oussama Sayari and Soundes Marzougui and Thomas Aulbach and Juliane Krämer and Jean-Pierre Seifert},
      title = {{HaMAYO}: A Fault-Tolerant Reconfigurable Hardware Implementation of the {MAYO} Signature Scheme},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1135},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1135}
}
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