Paper 2023/1095

Chosen-Key Distinguishing Attacks on Full AES-192, AES-256, Kiasu-BC, and More

Xiaoyang Dong, Tsinghua University
Shun Li, Nanyang Technological University
Phuong Pham, Nanyang Technological University
Abstract

At CRYPTO 2020, Liu et al. find that many differentials on Gimli are actually incompatible. On the related-key differential of AES, the incompatibilities also exist and are handled in different ad-hoc ways by adding respective constraints into the searching models. However, such an ad-hoc method is insufficient to rule out all the incompatibilities and may still output false positive related-key differentials. At CRYPTO 2022, a new approach combining a Constraint Programming (CP) tool and a triangulation algorithm to search for rebound attacks against AES- like hashing was proposed. In this paper, we combine and extend these techniques to create a uniform related-key differential search model, which can not only generate the related-key differentials on AES and similar ciphers but also immediately verify the existence of at least one key pair fulfilling the differentials. With the innovative automatic tool, we find new related-key differentials on full-round AES-192, AES-256, Kiasu-BC, and round-reduced Deoxys-BC. Based on these findings, full- round limited-birthday chosen-key distinguishing attacks on AES-192, AES-256, and Kiasu-BC are presented, as well as the first chosen-key dis- tinguisher on reduced Deoxys-BC. Furthermore, a limited-birthday dis- tinguisher on 9-round Kiasu-BC with practical complexities is found for the first time.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
Contact author(s)
xiaoyangdong @ tsinghua edu cn
shun li @ ntu edu sg
pham0079 @ e ntu edu sg
History
2023-07-17: revised
2023-07-14: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1095
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1095,
      author = {Xiaoyang Dong and Shun Li and Phuong Pham},
      title = {Chosen-Key Distinguishing Attacks on Full {AES}-192, {AES}-256, Kiasu-{BC}, and More},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1095},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1095}
}
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