Paper 2023/1078
Bypassing Android isolation with fuel gauges: new risks with advanced power ICs
Abstract
Efficient power management is critical for embedded devices, both for extending their lifetime and ensuring safety. However, this can be a challenging task due to the unpredictability of the batteries commonly used in such devices. To address this issue, dedicated Integrated Circuits known as "fuel gauges" are often employed outside of the System-On-Chip. These devices provide various metrics about the available energy source and are highly accurate. However, their precision can also be exploited by malicious actors to compromise platform confidentiality if the Operating System fails to intervene. Depending on the fuel gauge and OS configuration, several attack scenarios are possible. In this article, we focus on Android and demonstrate how it is possible to bypass application isolation to recover PINs entered in other processes.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Fuel gaugeEmbedded systemConfidentiality
- Contact author(s)
-
vincent giraud @ ens fr
david naccache @ ens fr - History
- 2023-07-16: approved
- 2023-07-11: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1078
- License
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CC BY-SA
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1078,
author = {Vincent Giraud and David Naccache},
title = {Bypassing Android isolation with fuel gauges: new risks with advanced power ICs},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1078},
year = {2023},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1078}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1078}
}
