Paper 2023/1039

SoK: Privacy-Preserving Signatures

Alishah Chator, Johns Hopkins University
Matthew Green, Johns Hopkins University
Pratyush Ranjan Tiwari, Johns Hopkins University
Abstract

Modern security systems depend fundamentally on the ability of users to authenticate their communications to other parties in a network. Unfortunately, cryptographic authentication can substantially undermine the privacy of users. One possible solution to this problem is to use privacy-preserving cryptographic authentication. These protocols allow users to authenticate their communications without revealing their identity to the verifier. In the non-interactive setting, the most common protocols include blind, ring, and group signatures, each of which has been the subject of enormous research in the security and cryptography literature. These primitives are now being deployed at scale in major applications, including Intel's SGX software attestation framework. The depth of the research literature and the prospect of large-scale deployment motivate us to systematize our understanding of the research in this area. This work provides an overview of these techniques, focusing on applications and efficiency.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Blind SignaturesGroup SignaturesRing SignaturesPrivate AuthenticationPrivacy-preserving Signatures
Contact author(s)
alishahc @ cs jhu edu
mgreen @ cs jhu edu
pratyush @ cs jhu edu
History
2023-07-05: revised
2023-07-04: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1039
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1039,
      author = {Alishah Chator and Matthew Green and Pratyush Ranjan Tiwari},
      title = {{SoK}: Privacy-Preserving Signatures},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1039},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1039}
}
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