Paper 2022/952
When Frodo Flips: End-to-End Key Recovery on FrodoKEM via Rowhammer
Abstract
In this work, we recover the private key material of the FrodoKEM key exchange mechanism as submitted to the NIST Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization process. The new mechanism that allows for this is a Rowhammer-assisted \emph{poisoning} of the FrodoKEM Key Generation (KeyGen) process. The Rowhammer side-channel is a hardware-based security exploit that allows flipping bits in DRAM by “hammering” rows of memory adjacent to some target-victim memory location by repeated memory accesses. Using Rowhammer, we induce the FrodoKEM software to output a higher-error Public Key (PK),
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. ACM CCS 2022
- Keywords
- Post Quantum cryptography Rowhammer
- Contact author(s)
-
mjfahr @ uark edu
hkippen @ umd edu
ankwong @ umich edu
thinh @ gwu edu
jacob lichtinger @ nist gov
danadach @ ece umd edu
genkin @ gatech edu
ahnelson @ uark edu
ray perlner @ nist gov
arkady @ gwu edu
dapon @ mitre org - History
- 2022-07-23: approved
- 2022-07-23: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/952
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/952, author = {Michael Fahr Jr. and Hunter Kippen and Andrew Kwong and Thinh Dang and Jacob Lichtinger and Dana Dachman-Soled and Daniel Genkin and Alexander Nelson and Ray Perlner and Arkady Yerukhimovich and Daniel Apon}, title = {When Frodo Flips: End-to-End Key Recovery on {FrodoKEM} via Rowhammer}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/952}, year = {2022}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/952} }