Paper 2022/906

A Random Oracle for All of Us

Marc Fischlin, TU Darmstadt
Felix Rohrbach, TU Darmstadt
Tobias Schmalz, TU Darmstadt
Abstract

We introduce the notion of a universal random oracle. Analogously to a classical random oracle it idealizes hash functions as random functions. However, as opposed to a classical random oracle which is created freshly and independently for each adversary, the universal random oracle should provide security of a cryptographic protocol against all adversaries simultaneously. This should even hold if the adversary now depends on the random function. This reflects better the idea that the strong hash functions like SHA-2 and SHA-3 are fixed before the adversary decides upon the attack strategy. Besides formalizing the notion of the universal random oracle model we show that the model is asymptotically equivalent to Unruh's auxiliary-input random oracle model (Crypto 2007). In Unruh's model the adversary receives some inefficiently computed information about the random oracle as extra input. Noteworthy, while security in the universal random oracle model implies security in the auxiliary-input random oracle model tightly, the converse implication introduces an inevitable security loss. This implies that the universal random oracle model provides stronger guarantees in terms of concrete security. Validating the model we finally show, via a direct proof with concrete security, that a universal random oracle is one-way.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Africacrypt 2022
Keywords
random oracles
Contact author(s)
marc fischlin @ cryptoplexity de
felix rohrbach @ cryptoplexity de
tobias schmalz @ cryptoplexity de
History
2022-07-14: approved
2022-07-12: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/906
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/906,
      author = {Marc Fischlin and Felix Rohrbach and Tobias Schmalz},
      title = {A Random Oracle for All of Us},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/906},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/906}
}
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