Paper 2022/895

Security Analysis of RSA-BSSA

Anna Lysyanskaya
Abstract

A blind signature scheme is a digital signature scheme that allows the signature recipient to obtain a digital signature on a message of her choice without revealing anything about the message or the resulting signature to the signer. Blind signature schemes have recently found applications for privacy-preserving web browsing and ad ecosystems, and as such, are ripe for standardization. Recently, Denis, Jacobs and Wood [18, 17] submitted an IETF draft for a standard for a blind version of RSA-PSS. Here, we show that this proposed standard constitutes a one-more unforgeable blind signature scheme in the random-oracle model under the one-more-RSA assumption. Further, we show that the blind version of RSA-FDH proposed and analyzed by Bellare, Namprempre, Pointcheval and Semanko does not satisfy blindness when the public key (N,e) is chosen maliciously, but satisfies a weaker notion of a blind token.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Blind signatures
Contact author(s)
anna_lysyanskaya @ brown edu
History
2022-07-08: approved
2022-07-08: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/895
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/895,
      author = {Anna Lysyanskaya},
      title = {Security Analysis of RSA-BSSA},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/895},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/895}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/895}
}
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