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Paper 2022/856

Mix-Nets from Re-Randomizable and Replayable CCA-secure Public-Key Encryption

Antonio Faonio, EURECOM
Luigi Russo, EURECOM
Abstract

Mix-nets are protocols that allow a set of senders to send messages anonymously. Faonio et al. (ASIACRYPT’19) showed how to instantiate mix-net protocols based on Public-Verifiable Re-randomizable Replayable CCA-secure (Rand-RCCA) PKE schemes. The bottleneck of their approach is that public-verifiable Rand-RCCA PKEs are less efficient than typical CPA-secure re-randomizable PKEs. In this paper, we revisit their mix-net protocol, showing how to get rid of the cumbersome public-verifiability property, and we give a more efficient instantiation for the mix-net protocol based on a (non publicly-verifiable) Rand-RCCA scheme. Additionally, we give a more careful security analysis of their mix-net protocol.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. SCN 2022
Keywords
mix-net
Contact author(s)
faonio @ eurecom fr
russol @ eurecom fr
History
2022-06-29: approved
2022-06-28: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/856
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/856,
      author = {Antonio Faonio and Luigi Russo},
      title = {Mix-Nets from Re-Randomizable and Replayable CCA-secure Public-Key Encryption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/856},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/856}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/856}
}
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