Paper 2022/844

Security Analysis of a Recent Pairing-based Certificateless Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol for Blockchain-based WBANs

Yong-Jin Kim, Faculty of Mathematics, KIM IL SUNG University, Pyongyang, 999093, D.P.R of Korea
Dok-Jun An, Faculty of Mathematics, KIM IL SUNG University, Pyongyang, 999093, D.P.R of Korea
Kum-Sok Sin, Pyongyang Software JDC Institute, 999093, D.P.R of Korea
Son-Gyong Kim, Institute of Management Practice, Pyongyang, 99903, D. P. R of Korea
Abstract

In this paper, we proposed some vulnerabilities of a recent pairing-based certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol for blockchain-based wireless body area networks (WBAN). According to our analysis, this protocol is insecure against key offset attack (KOA), basic impersonation attack (BIA), and man-in-the-middle attack (MMA) of the malicious key generation center (KGC) administrators. We also found and pointed out some errors in the description of the protocol.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Security Analysis Certificateless AKA Blockchain WBAN
Contact author(s)
kyj0916 @ 126 com
mathkyy @ 126 com
mathrsh @ 163 com
mathjyh @ 126 com
History
2022-06-27: revised
2022-06-27: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/844
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/844,
      author = {Yong-Jin Kim and Dok-Jun An and Kum-Sok Sin and Son-Gyong Kim},
      title = {Security Analysis of a Recent Pairing-based Certificateless Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol for Blockchain-based WBANs},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/844},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/844}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/844}
}
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