Paper 2022/833
Stronger Security for Non-Interactive Threshold Signatures: BLS and FROST
, University of California, San Diego, University of Washington, University of WashingtonAbstract
We give a unified syntax, and a hierarchy of definitions of security of increasing strength, for non-interactive threshold signature schemes. They cover both fully non-interactive schemes (these are ones that have a single-round signing protocol, the canonical example being threshold-BLS) and ones, like FROST, that have a prior round of message-independent pre-processing. The definitions in the upper echelon of our hierarchy ask for security that is well beyond any currently defined, let alone proven to be met by the just-mentioned schemes, yet natural, and important for modern applications like securing digital wallets. We prove that BLS and FROST are better than advertised, meeting some of these stronger definitions. Yet, they fall short of meeting our strongest definition, a gap we fill for FROST via a simple enhancement to the scheme. We also surface subtle differences in the security achieved by variants of FROST.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- SignaturesThreshold Cryptography
- Contact author(s)
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mihir @ eng ucsd edu
tessaro @ cs washington edu
zhucz20 @ cs washington edu - History
- 2024-12-04: last of 2 revisions
- 2022-06-23: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/833
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/833,
author = {Mihir Bellare and Stefano Tessaro and Chenzhi Zhu},
title = {Stronger Security for Non-Interactive Threshold Signatures: {BLS} and {FROST}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/833},
year = {2022},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/833}
}
