Paper 2022/807
Side-Channel Analysis of Saber KEM Using Amplitude-Modulated EM Emanations
Abstract
In the ongoing last round of NIST’s post-quantum cryptography standardization competition, side-channel analysis of finalists is a main focus of attention. While their resistance to timing, power and near field electromagnetic (EM) side-channels has been thoroughly investigated, amplitude-modulated EM emanations has not been considered so far. The attacks based on amplitude-modulated EM emanations are more stealthy because they exploit side-channels intertwined into the signal transmitted by an on-chip antenna. Thus, they can be mounted on a distance from the device under attack. In this paper, we present the first results of an amplitude-modulated EM side-channel analysis of one of the NIST PQ finalists, Saber key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), implemented on the nRF52832 (ARM Cortex-M4) system-on-chip supporting Bluetooth 5. By capturing amplitude-modulated EM emanations during decapsulation, we can recover each bit of the session key with 0.91 probability on average.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Euromicro Conference on Digital Systems Design 2022
- Keywords
- Post-quantum cryptography Saber KEM LWE/LWR-based KEM Side-channel attack EM analysis Deep learning
- Contact author(s)
-
ruize @ kth se
kngo @ kth se
dubrova @ kth se - History
- 2022-06-23: approved
- 2022-06-21: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/807
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/807,
author = {Ruize Wang and Kalle Ngo and Elena Dubrova},
title = {Side-Channel Analysis of Saber KEM Using Amplitude-Modulated EM Emanations},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/807},
year = {2022},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/807}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/807}
}
