The Cost of Statistical Security in Interactive Proofs for Repeated Squaring

Abstract

In recent years, the number of applications of the repeated squaring assumption has been growing rapidly. The assumption states that, given a group element $x$, an integer $T$, and an RSA modulus $N$, it is hard to compute $x^{2^T} \mod N$---or even decide whether $y\stackrel{?}{=}x^{2^T} \mod N$---in parallel time less than the trivial approach of computing $T$ sequential squarings. This rise has been driven by efficient interactive proofs for repeated squaring, opening the door to more efficient constructions of verifiable delay functions, various secure computation primitives, and proof systems for more general languages. In this work, we study the complexity of statistically-sound interactive proofs for the repeated squaring relation. Technically, we consider interactive proofs where the prover sends at most $k \ge 0$ elements per round and the verifier performs generic group operations over the group $\mathbb{Z}_N^\star$. As our main contribution, we show that for any one-round proof with a randomized verifier (i.e., an MA proof) the verifier either runs in parallel time $\Omega(T/(k+1))$ with high probability, or is able to factor $N$ given the proof provided by the prover. This shows that either the prover essentially sends $p,q$ such that $N = p\cdot q$ (which is infeasible or undesirable in most applications), or a variant of Pietrzak's proof of repeated squaring (ITCS 2019) has optimal verifier complexity $O(T/(k+1))$. In particular, it is impossible to obtain a statistically-sound one-round proof of repeated squaring with efficiency on par with the computationally-sound protocol of Wesolowski (EUROCRYPT 2019), with a generic group verifier. We further extend our one-round lower bound to a natural class of recursive (multi-round) interactive proofs for repeated squaring.

Available format(s)
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Interactive ProofsRepeated SquaringLower Bounds
Contact author(s)
cfreitag @ cs cornell edu
ilank @ cs huji ac il
History
2022-06-16: approved
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/766

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/766,
author = {Cody Freitag and Ilan Komargodski},
title = {The Cost of Statistical Security in Interactive Proofs for Repeated Squaring},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/766},
year = {2022},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/766}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/766}
}

Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.