Paper 2022/737

Side-channel and Fault-injection attacks over Lattice-based Post-quantum Schemes (Kyber, Dilithium): Survey and New Results

Prasanna Ravi, Nanyang Technological University
Anupam Chattopadhyay, Nanyang Technological University
Anubhab Baksi, Nanyang Technological University
Abstract

In this work, we present a systematic study of Side-Channel Attacks (SCA) and Fault Injection Attacks (FIA) on structured lattice-based schemes, with main focus on Kyber Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) and Dilithium signature scheme, which are leading candidates in the NIST standardization process for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). Through our study, we attempt to understand the underlying similarities and differences between the existing attacks, while classify them into different categories. Given the wide-variety of reported attacks, simultaneous protection against all the attacks requires to implement customized protections/countermeasures for both Kyber and Dilithium. We therefore present a range of customized countermeasures, capable of providing defenses/mitigations against existing SCA/FIA. Amongst the presented countermeasures, we propose two novel countermeasures to protect Kyber KEM against SCA and FIA assisted chosen-ciphertext attacks. We implement the presented countermeasures within two well-known public software libraries for PQC - (1) pqm4 library for the ARM Cortex-M4 based microcontroller and (2) liboqs library for the Raspberry Pi 3 Model B Plus based on the ARM Cortex-A53 processor. Our performance evaluation reveals that the presented custom countermeasures incur reasonable performance overheads, on both the evaluated embedded platforms. We therefore believe our work argues for usage of custom countermeasures within real-world implementations of lattice-based schemes, either in a standalone manner, or as reinforcements to generic countermeasures such as masking.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Lattice-based Cryptography Side-Channel Attacks Fault-Injection Attacks Kyber Dilithium Countermeasures
Contact author(s)
prasanna ravi @ ntu edu sg
anupam @ ntu edu sg
anubhab baksi @ ntu edu sg
History
2022-06-09: revised
2022-06-09: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/737
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/737,
      author = {Prasanna Ravi and Anupam Chattopadhyay and Anubhab Baksi},
      title = {Side-channel and Fault-injection attacks over Lattice-based Post-quantum Schemes (Kyber, Dilithium): Survey and New Results},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/737},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/737}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/737}
}
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