Paper 2022/687
Adaptively Secure Single Secret Leader Election from DDH
Abstract
Single Secret Leader Election protocols (SSLE, for short) allow a group of users to select a random leader so that the latter remains secret until she decides to reveal herself. Thanks to this feature, SSLE can be used to build an election mechanism for proof-of-stake based blockchains. In particular, a recent work by Azouvi and Cappelletti (ACM AFT 2021) shows that in comparison to probabilistic leader election methods, SSLE-based proof-of-stake blockchains have significant security gains, both with respect to grinding attacks and with respect to the private attack. Yet, as of today, very few concrete constructions of SSLE are known. In particular, all existing protocols are only secure in a model where the adversary is supposed to corrupt participants before the protocol starts -- an assumption that clashes with the highly dynamic nature of decentralized blockchain protocols. In this paper we make progress in the study of SSLE by proposing new efficient constructions that achieve stronger security guarantees than previous work. In particular, we propose the first SSLE protocol that achieves adaptive security. Our scheme is proven secure in the universal composability model and achieves efficiency comparable to previous, less secure, realizations in the state of the art.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. PODC '22
- DOI
- 10.1145/3519270.3538424
- Keywords
- Secret Leader Election Consensus Blockchain Proof of Stake Universal Composability Active Security
- Contact author(s)
-
catalano @ dmi unict it
dario fiore @ imdea org
emanuele giunta @ imdea org - History
- 2022-09-19: revised
- 2022-05-31: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/687
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/687, author = {Dario Catalano and Dario Fiore and Emanuele Giunta}, title = {Adaptively Secure Single Secret Leader Election from {DDH}}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/687}, year = {2022}, doi = {10.1145/3519270.3538424}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/687} }