Post-Quantum Secure Boot on Vehicle Network Processors

Joppe W.  Bos; Brian Carlson; Joost Renes; Marius Rotaru; Daan Sprenkels; Geoffrey P.  Waters

Paper 2022/635

Post-Quantum Secure Boot on Vehicle Network Processors

Joppe W. Bos, Brian Carlson, Joost Renes, Marius Rotaru, Daan Sprenkels, and Geoffrey P. Waters

Abstract

The ability to trust a system to act safely and securely strongly relies on the integrity of the software that it runs. To guarantee authenticity of the software one can include cryptographic data such as digital signatures on application images that can only be generated by trusted parties. These are typically based on cryptographic primitives such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) or Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC), whose security will be lost whenever a large enough quantum computer is built. For that reason, migration towards Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is necessary. This paper investigates the practical impact of migrating the secure boot flow on a Vehicle Network Processor (S32G274A) towards PQC. We create a low-memory fault-attack- resistant implementation of the Dilithium signature verification algorithm and evaluate its impact on the boot flow.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: Post-Quantum Cryptography Digital Signatures Secure Boot Automotive Processors S32G274A
Contact author(s): joppe bos @ nxp com
joost renes @ nxp com
daan @ dsprenkels com
History: 2022-05-23: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2022/635
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/635,
      author = {Joppe W.  Bos and Brian Carlson and Joost Renes and Marius Rotaru and Daan Sprenkels and Geoffrey P.  Waters},
      title = {Post-Quantum Secure Boot on Vehicle Network Processors},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/635},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/635}
}