Paper 2022/606

Security Against Honorific Adversaries: Efficient MPC with Server-aided Public Verifiability

Li Duan, Yufan Jiang, Yong Li, Jörn Müller-Quade, and Andy Rupp


Secure multiparty computation (MPC) allows distrustful parties to jointly compute some functions while keeping their private secrets unrevealed. MPC adversaries are often categorized as semi-honest and malicious, depending on whether they follow the protocol specifications or not. Covert security was first introduced by Aumann and Lindell in 2007, which models a third type of active adversaries who cheat but can be caught with a probability. However, this probability is predefined externally, and the misbehavior detection must be made by other honest participants with cut-and-choose in current constructions. In this paper, we propose a new security notion called security against honorific adversaries, who may cheat during the protocol execution but are extremely unwilling to be punished. Intuitively, honorific adversaries can cheat successfully, but decisive evidence of misbehavior will be left to honest parties with a probability close to one. By introducing an independent but not trusted auditor to the MPC ideal functionality in the universal composability framework (UC), we avoid heavy cryptographic machinery in detection and complicated discussion about the probability of being caught. With this new notion, we construct new provably secure protocols without cut-and-choose for garbled circuits that are much more efficient than those in the covert and malicious model, with slightly more overhead than passively secure protocols.

Available format(s)
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
MPCsecurity notionefficient protocolshonorific adversaries
Contact author(s)
yufantief @ gmail com
2022-05-23: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Li Duan and Yufan Jiang and Yong Li and Jörn Müller-Quade and Andy Rupp},
      title = {Security Against Honorific Adversaries: Efficient {MPC} with Server-aided Public Verifiability},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/606},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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