Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2022/539

Post Quantum Noise

Yawning Angel and Benjamin Dowling and Andreas Hülsing and Peter Schwabe and Florian Weber

Abstract: We introduce PQNoise, a post-quantum variant of the Noise framework. We demonstrate that it is possible to replace the Diffie-Hellman key-exchanges in Noise with KEMs in a secure way. A challenge is the inability to combine key pairs of KEMs, which can be resolved by certain forms of randomness-hardening for which we introduce a formal abstraction. We provide a generic recipe to turn classical Noise patterns into PQNoise patterns. We prove that the resulting PQNoise patterns achieve confidentiality and authenticity in the fACCE-model. Moreover we show that for those classical Noise-patterns that have been conjectured or proven secure in the fACCE-model our matching PQNoise-patterns eventually achieve the same security. Our security proof is generic and applies to any valid PQNoise pattern. This is made possible by another abstraction, called a hash-object, which hides the exact workings of how keying material is processed in an abstract stateful object that outputs pseudorandom keys under different corruption patterns. We also show that the hash chains used in Noise are a secure hash-object. Finally, we demonstrate the practicality of PQNoise delivering benchmarks for several base patterns.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Protocol, Post-Quantum Cryptography, Noise, PQNoise, Provable Security

Date: received 4 May 2022, last revised 10 May 2022

Contact author: mail at florianjw de, yawning at oasislabs com, b dowling at sheffield ac uk, andreas at huelsing net, peter at cryptojedi org

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Author list in alphabetical order, see: https://www.ams.org/profession/leaders/culture/CultureStatement04.pdf

Version: 20220510:115514 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2022/539


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