Paper 2022/539

Post Quantum Noise

Yawning Angel, Oasis Labs
Benjamin Dowling, University of Sheffield
Andreas Hülsing, TU Eindhoven
Peter Schwabe, MPI-SP
Fiona Johanna Weber, Eindhoven University of Technology

We introduce PQNoise, a post-quantum variant of the Noise framework. We demonstrate that it is possible to replace the Diffie-Hellman key-exchanges in Noise with KEMs in a secure way. A challenge is the inability to combine key pairs of KEMs, which can be resolved by certain forms of randomness-hardening for which we introduce a formal abstraction. We provide a generic recipe to turn classical Noise patterns into PQNoise patterns. We prove that the resulting PQNoise patterns achieve confidentiality and authenticity in the fACCE-model. Moreover we show that for those classical Noise-patterns that have been conjectured or proven secure in the fACCE-model our matching PQNoise-patterns eventually achieve the same security. Our security proof is generic and applies to any valid PQNoise pattern. This is made possible by another abstraction, called a hash-object, which hides the exact workings of how keying material is processed in an abstract stateful object that outputs pseudorandom keys under different corruption patterns. We also show that the hash chains used in Noise are a secure hash-object. Finally, we demonstrate the practicality of PQNoise delivering benchmarks for several base patterns.

Note: Author list in alphabetical order, see:

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. CCS 2022
ProtocolPost-Quantum CryptographyNoisePQNoiseProvable Security
Contact author(s)
yawning @ oasislabs com
b dowling @ sheffield ac uk
andreas @ huelsing net
peter @ cryptojedi org
crypto @ fionajw de
2023-09-25: last of 4 revisions
2022-05-10: received
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Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Yawning Angel and Benjamin Dowling and Andreas Hülsing and Peter Schwabe and Fiona Johanna Weber},
      title = {Post Quantum Noise},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/539},
      year = {2022},
      doi = {10.1145/3548606.3560577},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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