Paper 2022/538
Post-Quantum Signatures on RISC-V with Hardware Acceleration
Abstract
CRYSTALS-Dilithium and Falcon are digital signature algorithms based on cryptographic lattices, that are considered secure even if large-scale quantum computers will be able to break conventional public-key cryptography. Both schemes have been selected for standardization in the NIST post-quantum competition. In this work, we present a RISC-V HW/SW odesign that aims to combine the advantages of software- and hardware implementations, i.e. flexibility and performance. It shows the use of lexible hardware accelerators, which have been previously used for Public-Key Encryption (PKE) and Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), for post-quantum signatures. It is optimized for Dilithium as a generic signature cheme but also accelerates applications that require fast verification of Falcon’s compact signatures. We provide a comparison with previous works showing that for Dilithium and Falcon, cycle counts are significantly reduced, such that our design is faster than previous software implementations or other HW/SW codesigns. In addition to that, we present a compact Globalfoundries 22 nm ASIC design that runs at 800MHz. By using hardware acceleration, energy consumption for Dilithium is reduced by up to 92.2%, and up to 67.5% for Falcon’s signature verification.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
- DOI
- 10.1145/3579092
- Keywords
- Post-QuantumNIST PQCDigital SignaturesHWSW CodesignCRYSTALS-DilithiumFalconRISC-V
- Contact author(s)
-
patrick karl @ tum de
jonas schupp @ tum de
tim fritzmann @ tum de
sigl @ tum de - History
- 2023-03-01: last of 2 revisions
- 2022-05-10: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/538
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/538, author = {Patrick Karl and Jonas Schupp and Tim Fritzmann and Georg Sigl}, title = {Post-Quantum Signatures on {RISC}-V with Hardware Acceleration}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/538}, year = {2022}, doi = {10.1145/3579092}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/538} }