Paper 2022/529

Laconic Private Set-Intersection From Pairings

Diego Aranha, Aarhus University
Chuanwei Lin, Aarhus University
Claudio Orlandi, Aarhus University
Mark Simkin, Ethereum Foundation

Private set-intersection (PSI) is one of the most practically relevant special-purpose secure multiparty computation tasks, as it is motivated by many real-world applications. In this paper we present a new private set-intersection protocol which is laconic, meaning that the protocol only has two rounds and that the first message is independent of the set sizes. Laconic PSI can be useful in applications, where servers with large sets would like to learn the intersection of their set with smaller sets owned by resource-constrained clients and where multiple rounds of interactions are not possible. Previously, practically relevant laconic PSI protocols were only known from factoring-type assumptions. The contributions of this work are twofold: 1) We present the first laconic PSI protocol based on assumptions over pairing-friendly elliptic curves; and 2) For the first time we provide empirical evaluation of any laconic PSI protocol by carefully implementing and optimising both our and previous protocols. Our experimental results shows that our protocol outperforms prior laconic PSI protocols.

Note: Fixed a few more typos, added a clarification about the protocol version implemented.

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. ACM CCS 2022
Private Set-Intersection Pairing Based Cryptography
Contact author(s)
dfaranha @ cs au dk
chuanwei lin @ au dk
orlandi @ cs au dk
mark simkin @ ethereum org
2022-09-06: last of 2 revisions
2022-05-10: received
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Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Diego Aranha and Chuanwei Lin and Claudio Orlandi and Mark Simkin},
      title = {Laconic Private Set-Intersection From Pairings},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/529},
      year = {2022},
      doi = {10.1145/3548606.3560642},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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