Side-Channel Analysis of Lattice-Based Post-Quantum Cryptography: Exploiting Polynomial Multiplication

Catinca Mujdei; Arthur Beckers; Jose Maria Bermudo Mera; Angshuman Karmakar; Lennert Wouters; Ingrid Verbauwhede

Paper 2022/474

Side-Channel Analysis of Lattice-Based Post-Quantum Cryptography: Exploiting Polynomial Multiplication

Catinca Mujdei, Arthur Beckers, Jose Maria Bermudo Mera, Angshuman Karmakar, Lennert Wouters, and Ingrid Verbauwhede

Abstract

Polynomial multiplication algorithms such as Toom-Cook and the Number Theoretic Transform are fundamental building blocks for lattice-based post-quantum cryptography. In this work, we present correlation power analysis-based side-channel analysis methodologies targeting every polynomial multiplication strategy for all lattice-based post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms in the final round of the NIST post-quantum standardization procedure. We perform practical experiments on real side-channel measurements demonstrating that our method allows to extract the secret key from all lattice-based post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms. Our analysis demonstrates that the used polynomial multiplication strategy can significantly impact the time complexity of the attack.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Contact author(s): lennert wouters @ esat kuleuven be
angshuman karmakar @ esat kuleuven be
History: 2022-05-20: revised; 2022-04-22: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2022/474
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/474,
      author = {Catinca Mujdei and Arthur Beckers and Jose Maria Bermudo Mera and Angshuman Karmakar and Lennert Wouters and Ingrid Verbauwhede},
      title = {Side-Channel Analysis of Lattice-Based Post-Quantum Cryptography: Exploiting Polynomial Multiplication},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/474},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/474}
}