Paper 2022/474

Side-Channel Analysis of Lattice-Based Post-Quantum Cryptography: Exploiting Polynomial Multiplication

Catinca Mujdei, Arthur Beckers, Jose Maria Bermudo Mera, Angshuman Karmakar, Lennert Wouters, and Ingrid Verbauwhede

Abstract

Polynomial multiplication algorithms such as Toom-Cook and the Number Theoretic Transform are fundamental building blocks for lattice-based post-quantum cryptography. In this work, we present correlation power analysis-based side-channel analysis methodologies targeting every polynomial multiplication strategy for all lattice-based post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms in the final round of the NIST post-quantum standardization procedure. We perform practical experiments on real side-channel measurements demonstrating that our method allows to extract the secret key from all lattice-based post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms. Our analysis demonstrates that the used polynomial multiplication strategy can significantly impact the time complexity of the attack.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint. Minor revision.
Contact author(s)
lennert wouters @ esat kuleuven be
angshuman karmakar @ esat kuleuven be
History
2022-05-20: revised
2022-04-22: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/474
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/474,
      author = {Catinca Mujdei and Arthur Beckers and Jose Maria Bermudo Mera and Angshuman Karmakar and Lennert Wouters and Ingrid Verbauwhede},
      title = {Side-Channel Analysis of Lattice-Based Post-Quantum Cryptography: Exploiting Polynomial Multiplication},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/474},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/474}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/474}
}
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