Paper 2022/471
Breaking Masked Implementations of the Clyde-Cipher by Means of Side-Channel Analysis - A Report on the CHES Challenge Side-Channel Contest 2020
Abstract
In this paper we present our solution to the CHES Challenge 2020, the task of which it was to break masked hardware respective software
implementations of the lightweight cipher Clyde by means of side-channel analysis.
We target the secret cipher state after processing of the first
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in TCHES 2022
- Keywords
- Lightweight cryptography Clyde-cipher Side-channel analysis Countermeasures Masking Secret-sharing ISW-Multiplication Deep neural network Residual neural network Stochastic approach CHES Challenge 2020
- Contact author(s)
-
aron gohr @ gmail com
Friederike laus @ bsi bund de
Werner Schindler @ bsi bund de - History
- 2022-08-16: revised
- 2022-04-22: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/471
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/471, author = {Aron Gohr and Friederike Laus and Werner Schindler}, title = {Breaking Masked Implementations of the Clyde-Cipher by Means of Side-Channel Analysis - A Report on the {CHES} Challenge Side-Channel Contest 2020}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/471}, year = {2022}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/471} }