Paper 2022/446

Fast Side-Channel Key-Recovery Attack against Elephant Dumbo

Louis Vialar

Abstract

In this paper, we present an efficient side-channel key recovery attack against Dumbo, the 160-bit variant of NIST lightweight cryptography contest candidate Elephant. We use Correlation Power Analysis to attack the first round of the Spongent permutation during the absorption of the first block of associated data. The full attack runs in about a minute on a common laptop and only requires around 30 power traces to recover the entire secret key on an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller clocked at 7.4MHz. This is, to the best of our knoweledge, the first attack of this type presented against Elephant.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. NIST LWC Workshop, SSTIC
Keywords
secret-key cryptographylightweight cryptographyside-channel analysispower analysiscorrelation power analysis
Contact author(s)
louis @ louisvialar me
History
2022-04-12: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/446
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/446,
      author = {Louis Vialar},
      title = {Fast Side-Channel Key-Recovery Attack against Elephant Dumbo},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/446},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/446}
}
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