Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2022/446

Fast Side-Channel Key-Recovery Attack against Elephant Dumbo

Louis Vialar

Abstract: In this paper, we present an efficient side-channel key recovery attack against Dumbo, the 160-bit variant of NIST lightweight cryptography contest candidate Elephant. We use Correlation Power Analysis to attack the first round of the Spongent permutation during the absorption of the first block of associated data. The full attack runs in about a minute on a common laptop and only requires around 30 power traces to recover the entire secret key on an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller clocked at 7.4MHz. This is, to the best of our knoweledge, the first attack of this type presented against Elephant.

Category / Keywords: implementation / secret-key cryptography, lightweight cryptography, side-channel analysis, power analysis, correlation power analysis

Original Publication (with minor differences): NIST LWC Workshop, SSTIC

Date: received 8 Apr 2022

Contact author: louis at louisvialar me

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20220412:074341 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2022/446


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