In this work, we tackle the problem of formally defining and analyzing the security properties of RPCs. We first give security definitions against access-based cache side-channel attacks that capture security against known attacks such as Prime+Probe and Evict+Probe. Then, using these definitions, we obtain results that allow to guarantee security by adequately choosing the rekeying period, the key generation algorithm and the cache randomizer, thus providing security proofs for RPCs under certain assumptions.
Category / Keywords: applications / Cache side-channel attacks, Timing attacks, Randomization-based protected caches, Randomly-mapped caches, Pseudo-random functions, Security definition Original Publication (with major differences): IACR-CHES-2022 Date: received 6 Apr 2022 Contact author: jordi ribes at urv cat Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20220412:073954 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2022/440