Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2022/436

Publicly Accountable Robust Multi-Party Computation

Marc Rivinius and Pascal Reisert and Daniel Rausch and Ralf Küsters

Abstract: In recent years, lattice-based secure multi-party computation (MPC) has seen a rise in popularity and is used more and more in large scale applications like privacy-preserving cloud computing, electronic voting, or auctions. Many of these applications come with the following high security requirements: a computation result should be publicly verifiable, with everyone being able to identify a malicious party and hold it accountable, and a malicious party should not be able to corrupt the computation, force a protocol restart, or block honest parties or an honest third-party (client) that provided private inputs from receiving a correct result. The protocol should guarantee verifiability and accountability even if all protocol parties are malicious. While some protocols address one or two of these often essential security features, we present the first publicly verifiable and accountable, and (up to a threshold) robust SPDZ-like MPC protocol without restart. We propose protocols for accountable and robust online, offline, and setup computations. We adapt and partly extend the lattice-based commitment scheme by Baum et al. (SCN 2018) as well as other primitives like ZKPs. For the underlying commitment scheme and the underlying BGV encryption scheme we determine ideal parameters. We give a performance evaluation of our protocols and compare them to state-of-the-art protocols both with and without our target security features: public accountability, public verifiability and robustness.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / MPC, SPDZ, public accountability, publicly identifiable abort, public verifiability, robustness

Original Publication (with major differences): To appear in the IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, May 2022

Date: received 5 Apr 2022, last revised 7 Apr 2022

Contact author: marc rivinius at sec uni-stuttgart de

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Version: 20220407:174351 (All versions of this report)

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