Spectre Declassified: Reading from the Right Place at the Wrong Time

Basavesh Ammanaghatta Shivakumar; Jack Barnes; Gilles Barthe; Sunjay Cauligi; Chitchanok Chuengsatiansup; Daniel Genkin; Sioli O'Connell; Peter Schwabe; Rui Qi Sim; Yuval Yarom

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Paper 2022/426

Spectre Declassified: Reading from the Right Place at the Wrong Time

Basavesh Ammanaghatta Shivakumar, Jack Barnes, Gilles Barthe, Sunjay Cauligi, Chitchanok Chuengsatiansup, Daniel Genkin, Sioli O'Connell, Peter Schwabe, Rui Qi Sim, and Yuval Yarom

Abstract

Practical information-flow programming languages commonly allow controlled leakage via a “declassify” construct—programmers can use this construct to declare intentional leakage. For instance, cryptographic signatures and ciphertexts, which are computed from private keys, are viewed as secret by information-flow analyses. Cryptographic libraries can use declassify to make this data public, as it is no longer sensitive. In this paper, we study the impact of speculative execution in practical information-flow programming languages. First, we show that speculative execution leads to unintended leakage that violates the programmer’s intent. Concretely, we present a PoC that recovers the AES key of an implementation of AES written in FaCT, a domain-specific language for constant-time programming. Our PoC is an instance of a Spectre-PHT attack; interestingly, it remains effective even if the program is compiled with Speculative Load Hardening (SLH), a compiler-based countermeasure against Spectre-PHT. Second, we propose compiler-based countermeasures for protecting programs against leakage, and show that these countermeasures achieve relative non-interference: Informally, speculative leakage of the transformed programs must correspond to sequential leakage of the original programs. One of our countermeasures is a new transformation of independent interest called selective speculative load hardening (selSLH). SelSLH optimizes SLH as implemented by the LLVM compiler, reducing the number of inserted mitigations. Third, we implement one of our countermeasures in the FaCT compiler and evaluate performance overhead for core cryptographic routines from several open-source projects. The results indicate a moderate overhead. Although we do not implement selSLH, we carry a preliminary evaluation which suggests a significant gain over SLH for cryptographic implementations.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Contact author(s): basavesh shivakumar @ mpi-sp org
gjbarthe @ gmail com
sunjay cauligi @ mpi-sp org
chitchanok chuengsatiansup @ adelaide edu au
genkin @ gatech edu
sioli oconnell @ adelaide edu au
peter @ cryptojedi org
rui sim @ adelaide edu au
yval @ cs adelaide edu au
History: 2022-04-06: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2022/426
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/426,
      author = {Basavesh Ammanaghatta Shivakumar and Jack Barnes and Gilles Barthe and Sunjay Cauligi and Chitchanok Chuengsatiansup and Daniel Genkin and Sioli O'Connell and Peter Schwabe and Rui Qi Sim and Yuval Yarom},
      title = {Spectre Declassified: Reading from the Right Place at the Wrong Time},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/426},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/426}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/426}
}