Paper 2022/397

Revocable Hierarchical Attribute-based Signatures from Lattices

Daniel Gardham and Mark Manulis


Attribute-based Signatures (ABS) allow users to obtain attributes from issuing authorities, and sign messages whilst simultaneously proving compliance of their attributes with a verification policy. ABS demands that both the signer and the set of attributes used to satisfy a policy remain hidden to the verifier. Hierarchical ABS (HABS) supporting roots of trust and delegation were recently proposed to alleviate scalability issues in centralised ABS schemes. An important yet challenging property for privacy-preserving ABS is revocation, which may be applied to signers or some of the attributes they possess. Existing ABS schemes lack efficient revocation of either signers or their attributes, relying on generic costly proofs.Moreover, in HABS there is a further need to support revocation of authorities on the delegation paths, which is not provided by existing HABS constructions. This paper proposes a direct HABS scheme with a Verifier-Local Revocation (VLR) property. We extend the original HABS security model to address revocation and develop a new attribute delegation technique with appropriate VLR mechanism for HABS, which also implies the first ABS scheme to support VLR. Moreover, our scheme supports inner-product signing policies, offering a wider class of attribute relations than previous HABS schemes, and is the first to be based on lattices, which are thought to offer post-quantum security.

Note: This is the full version of the paper that will appear in ACNS 2022.

Available format(s)
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision.ACNS 2022
attribute-based signaturesrevocation
Contact author(s)
daniel gardham @ surrey ac uk
2022-03-28: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Daniel Gardham and Mark Manulis},
      title = {Revocable Hierarchical Attribute-based Signatures from Lattices},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/397},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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