Paper 2022/369
Matching Attacks on Romulus-M
Makoto Habu, Kazuhiko Minematsu, and Tetsu Iwata
Abstract
This paper considers a problem of identifying matching attacks against Romulus-M, one of the ten finalists of NIST Lightweight Cryptography standardization project. Romulus-M is provably secure, i.e., there is a theorem statement showing the upper bound on the success probability of attacking the scheme as a function of adversaries' resources. If there exists an attack that matches the provable security bound, then this implies that the attack is optimal, and that the bound is tight in the sense that it cannot be improved. We show that the security bounds of Romulus-M are tight for a large class of parameters by presenting concrete matching attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Lightweight cryptographyProvable securityRomulus-MTightnessMatching attack
- Contact author(s)
-
habu makoto @ f mbox nagoya-u ac jp
tetsu iwata @ nagoya-u jp
k-minematsu @ nec com - History
- 2022-03-22: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/369
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/369,
author = {Makoto Habu and Kazuhiko Minematsu and Tetsu Iwata},
title = {Matching Attacks on Romulus-M},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/369},
year = {2022},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/369}
}
