Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2022/327
Provable Secure Software Masking in the Real-World
Arthur Beckers and Lennert Wouters and Benedikt Gierlichs and Bart Preneel and Ingrid Verbauwhede
Abstract: We evaluate eight implementations of provable secure side-channel masking schemes that were published in top-tier academic venues such as Eurocrypt, Asiacrypt, CHES and SAC. Specifically, we evaluate the side-channel attack resistance of eight open-source and first-order side-channel protected AES-128 software implementations on the Cortex-M4 platform. Using a T-test based leakage assessment we demonstrate that all implementations produce first-order leakage with as little
as 10,000 traces. Additionally, we demonstrate that all except for two Inner Product Masking based implementations are vulnerable to a straightforward correlation power analysis attack. We provide an assembly level analysis showing potential sources of leakage for two implementations.
Some of the studied implementations were provided for benchmarking purposes. We demonstrate several flaws in the benchmarking procedures and question the usefulness of the reported performance numbers in
the face of the implementations’ poor side-channel resistance. This work serves as a reminder that practical evaluations cannot be omitted in the context of side-channel analysis.
Category / Keywords: implementation / Side-Channel Analysis, Leakage Assessment, Masking in Software
Original Publication (with minor differences): Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design 2022
Date: received 8 Mar 2022
Contact author: lennert wouters at esat kuleuven be, benedikt gierlichs at esat kuleuven be
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20220314:114108 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2022/327
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