Surveying definitions of election verifiability

Ben Smyth; Michael R.  Clarkson

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Paper 2022/305

Surveying definitions of election verifiability

Ben Smyth and Michael R. Clarkson

Abstract

We explore definitions of verifiability by Juels et al. (2010), Cortier et al. (2014), and Kiayias et al. (2015). We discover that voting systems vulnerable to attacks can be proven to satisfy each of those definitions and conclude they are unsuitable for the analysis of voting systems. Our results will fuel the exploration for a new definition.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Foundations
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: attacks definitions election schemes foundations verifiability
Contact author(s): research @ bensmyth com
History: 2022-03-07: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2022/305
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/305,
      author = {Ben Smyth and Michael R.  Clarkson},
      title = {Surveying definitions of election verifiability},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/305},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/305}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/305}
}