Paper 2022/301

How Practical are Fault Injection Attacks, Really?

Jakub Breier
Xiaolu Hou
Abstract

Fault injection attacks (FIA) are a class of active physical attacks, mostly used for malicious purposes such as extraction of cryptographic keys, privilege escalation, attacks on neural network implementations. There are many techniques that can be used to cause the faults in integrated circuits, many of them coming from the area of failure analysis. In this paper we tackle the topic of practicality of FIA. We analyze the most commonly used techniques that can be found in the literature, such as voltage/clock glitching, electromagnetic pulses, lasers, and Rowhammer attacks. To summarize, FIA can be mounted on most commonly used architectures from ARM, Intel, AMD, by utilizing injection devices that are often below the thousand dollar mark. Therefore, we believe these attacks can be considered practical in many scenarios, especially when the attacker can physically access the target device.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Published elsewhere. IEEE Access
Keywords
fault injection attacks hardware security survey
Contact author(s)
jakub breier @ gmail com
History
2022-10-27: last of 3 revisions
2022-03-07: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/301
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/301,
      author = {Jakub Breier and Xiaolu Hou},
      title = {How Practical are Fault Injection Attacks, Really?},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/301},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/301}
}
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