Paper 2022/255

Round-Optimal Byzantine Agreement

Diana Ghinea, Vipul Goyal, and Chen-Da Liu-Zhang

Abstract

Byzantine agreement is a fundamental primitive in cryptography and distributed computing, and minimizing its round complexity is of paramount importance. It is long known that any randomized $r$-round protocol must fail with probability at least $(c\cdot r{)}^{-r}$, for some constant $c$, when the number of corruptions is linear in the number of parties, $t=\theta (n)$. On the other hand, current protocols fail with probability at least $2^{-r}$. Whether we can match the lower bound agreement probability remains unknown. In this work, we resolve this long-standing open question. We present a protocol that matches the lower bound up to constant factors. Our results hold under a (strongly rushing) adaptive adversary that can corrupt up to $$ parties, and our protocols use a public-key infrastructure and a trusted setup for unique threshold signatures. This is the first protocol that decreases the failure probability (overall) by a 'super-constant' factor per round.