Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2022/236

Characterizing the qIND-qCPA (in)security of the CBC, CFB, OFB and CTR modes of operation

Tristan NEMOZ and Zoé AMBLARD and Aurélien DUPIN

Abstract: We extend the work performed by Anand, Targhi, Tabia and Unruh (PQCrypto 2016) of studying the post-quantum security of the CBC, CFB, OFB and CTR modes of operation by considering all possible notions of qIND-qCPA security defined by Carstens, Ebrahimi, Tabia and Unruh (TCC 2021).

We show that the results obtained by Anand et al. for the qIND-qCPA-P6 security of these modes carry on to the others IND-qCPA notions, namely the qIND-qCPA-P10 and qIND-qCPA-P11 ones. We also show that CFB, CTR and OFB are insecure according to all of the other notions, regardless of the block cipher they are used with. We provide several results concerning the (in)security of CBC. First of all, we show that it is insecure according to the qIND-qCPA-P9 notion. By distinguishing on the nature of the underlying block cipher, we prove its qIND-qCPA-P5 security when based upon a qPRP and we prove that it can be qIND-qCPA-P13 insecure when based upon a PRP, thus fully characterizing it. We illustrate the later result by using as a counter-example the same block cipher used by Anand et al.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Post-quantum cryptography, Block ciphers, Modes of operation, qIND-qCPA security

Date: received 23 Feb 2022

Contact author: nemoz at eurecom fr, aurelien dupin at thalesgroup com, zoe amblard at thalesgroup com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20220225:080929 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2022/236


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