Paper 2022/196

Generalising Fault Attacks to Genus Two Isogeny Cryptosystems

Ariana Goh
Chu-Wee Lim
Yan Bo Ti

In this paper, we generalise the SIDH fault attack and the SIDH loop-abort fault attacks on supersingular isogeny cryptosystems (genus-1) to genus-2. Genus-2 isogeny-based cryptosystems are generalisations of its genus-1 counterpart, as such, attacks on the latter are believed to generalise to the former. The point perturbation attack on supersingular elliptic curve isogeny cryptography has been shown to be practical. We show in this paper that this fault attack continues to be practical in genus-2, albeit with a few additional traces required. We also show that the loop-abort attack carries over to the genus-2 setting seamlessly. This article is a minor revision of the version accepted to the workshop Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography 2022 (FDTC 2022).

Available format(s)
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. FDTC
isogeny-based cryptography fault attack
Contact author(s)
ari gzh @ gmail com
lchuwee @ dso org sg
yanbo ti @ gmail com
2022-10-25: last of 3 revisions
2022-02-20: received
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Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Ariana Goh and Chu-Wee Lim and Yan Bo Ti},
      title = {Generalising Fault Attacks to Genus Two Isogeny Cryptosystems},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/196},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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