Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2022/196

Generalising Fault Attacks to Genus Two Isogeny Cryptosystems

Ariana Goh and Chu-Wee Lim and Yan Bo Ti

Abstract: In this paper we generalise Ti's fault attack and the loop abort fault attacks on supersingular isogeny cryptosystems (genus one) to genus two. Genus two isogeny based cryptosystems are generalisations of its genus one counterpart, as such, attacks on the the latter are believed to generalise to the former.

Fault attacks on supersingular elliptic curve isogeny cryptography has been shown to be practical. We show in this paper that fault attacks continue to be practical in genus two, albeit with a few additional traces required.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / isogeny-based cryptography, fault attack

Date: received 18 Feb 2022, last revised 23 Feb 2022

Contact author: ari gzh at gmail com, lchuwee at dso org sg, yanbo ti at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20220223:114744 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2022/196