Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2022/194

Finding Collisions against 4-round SHA3-384 in Practical Time

Senyang Huang and Orna Agmon Ben-Yehuda and Orr Dunkelman and Alexander Maximov

Abstract: The Keccak sponge function family, designed by Bertoni et al. in 2007, was selected by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2012 as the next generation of Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-3). Due to its theoretical and practical importance, cryptanalysis against SHA-3 has attracted an increasing attention. To the best of our knowledge, the most powerful collision attack on SHA-3 up till now is the linearisation technique proposed by Jian Guo et al. However, that technique is infeasible to work on variants with a smaller input space, such as SHA3-384.

In this work we improve previous results with three ideas which were not used in previous works against SHA-3. First, in order to reduce constraints and increase flexibility in our solutions, we use 2-block messages instead of 1-block messages. Second, we reduce the connectivity problem into a satisfiability (SAT) problem, instead of applying the linearisation technique. Finally, we consider two new non-random properties of the Keccak non-linear layer and propose an efficient deduce-and-sieve algorithm based on these properties.

The resulting collision-finding algorithm on 4-round SHA3-384 has a practical time complexity of $2^{59.64}$ (and memory complexity of $2^{45.93}$). This greatly improves the previous best known collision attack by Dinur et al., whose $2^{147}$ time complexity was far from being practical. Although our attack does not threaten the security margin of the SHA-3 hash function, the tools developed in this paper could be useful in future analysis of other cryptographic primitives and also in development of new and faster SAT solvers.

Category / Keywords: SHA-3 hash function, collision attack, deduce-and-sieve algorithm, SAT solver

Date: received 18 Feb 2022, last revised 30 Mar 2022

Contact author: senyang huang at eit lth se

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20220330:144140 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2022/194


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