We propose a novel leakage assessment framework which enables to link non-specific leakage detection outcomes with size of the key guess that is necessary to exploit them. We therefore solve the problem of deciding if or not a leak is exploitable without the need for specific attacks. Our methodology furthermore enables (for a detected leak) to reveal the specific key bytes, and with that, it allows the construction of confirmatory attacks. This novel approach is enabled by proposing to cast the leakage detection problem as the statistical task of building key-dependent regression models: if such a model exists, then we know that the point leaks. Depending on the size and nature of the model, we can further judge the exploitability and provide a concrete attack vector.
Category / Keywords: implementation / Leakage detection, Side channel analysis Date: received 17 Feb 2022 Contact author: si-gao at outlook com, elisabeth oswald at aau at Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20220220:201617 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2022/182