Paper 2022/1748
RMC-PVC: A Multi-Client Reusable Verifiable Computation Protocol (Long version)
, Université Clermont-Auvergne, CNRS, Mines de Saint-Étienne, LIMOS, Université Clermont-Auvergne, CNRS, Mines de Saint-Étienne, LIMOS, Université de Limoges, XLIMAbstract
The verification of computations performed by an untrusted server is a cornerstone for delegated computations, especially in multi- clients setting where inputs are provided by different parties. As- suming a common secret between clients, a garbled circuit offers the attractive property to ensure the correctness of a result computed by the untrusted server while keeping the input and the function private. Yet, this verification can be guaranteed only once. Based on the notion of multi-key homomorphic encryption (MKHE), we propose RMC-PVC a multi-client verifiable computation proto- col, able to verify the correctness of computations performed by an untrusted server for inputs (encoded for a garbled circuit) provided by multiple clients. Thanks to MKHE, the garbled circuit is reusable an arbitrary number of times. In addition, each client can verify the computation by its own. Compared to a single-key FHE scheme, the MKHE usage in RMC-PVC allows to reduce the workload of the server and thus the response delay for the client. It also enforce the privacy of inputs, which are provided by different clients.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. SAC 23
- Keywords
- Verifiable Computation Multi-Client Multi-Key Homomorphic Encryption Garbled Circuit
- Contact author(s)
-
pascal lafourcade @ uca fr
gael marcadet @ uca fr
leo robert @ uca fr - History
- 2022-12-25: approved
- 2022-12-20: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1748
- License
-
CC BY-NC-SA
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1748,
author = {Pascal Lafourcade and Gael Marcadet and Léo Robert},
title = {{RMC}-{PVC}: A Multi-Client Reusable Verifiable Computation Protocol (Long version)},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1748},
year = {2022},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1748}
}
