Paper 2022/173

Collision-Resistance from Multi-Collision-Resistance

Ron D. Rothblum, Technion – Israel Institute of Technology
Prashant Nalini Vasudevan, National University of Singapore
Abstract

Collision-resistant hash functions (CRH) are a fundamental and ubiquitous cryptographic primitive. Several recent works have studied a relaxation of CRH called t-way multi-collision-resistant hash functions (t-MCRH). These are families of functions for which it is computationally hard to find a t-way collision, even though such collisions are abundant (and even (t-1)-way collisions may be easy to find). The case of t=2 corresponds to standard CRH, but it is natural to study t-MCRH for larger values of t. Multi-collision-resistance seems to be a qualitatively weaker property than standard collision-resistance. Nevertheless, in this work we show a non-blackbox transformation of any moderately shrinking t-MCRH, for t in {2,4}, into an (infinitely often secure) CRH. This transformation is non-constructive - we can prove the existence of a CRH but cannot explicitly point out a construction. Our result partially extends to larger values of t. In particular, we show that for suitable values of t>t', we can transform a t-MCRH into a t'-MCRH, at the cost of reducing the shrinkage of the resulting hash function family and settling for infinitely often security. This result utilizes the list-decodability properties of Reed-Solomon codes.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published by the IACR in CRYPTO 2022
Keywords
Collision-Resistant Hash Functions Multicollision Resistance
Contact author(s)
rothblum @ cs technion ac il
prashant @ comp nus edu sg
History
2022-06-22: last of 2 revisions
2022-02-20: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/173
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/173,
      author = {Ron D.  Rothblum and Prashant Nalini Vasudevan},
      title = {Collision-Resistance from Multi-Collision-Resistance},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/173},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/173}
}
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