Paper 2022/1715
An Algebraic Attack Against McEliece-like Cryptosystems Based on BCH Codes
Abstract
We present an algebraic attack on a McEliece-like scheme based on BCH codes (BCH-McEliece), where the Goppa code is replaced by a suitably permuted BCH code. Our attack continues the line of work devising attacks against McEliece-like schemes with Goppa-like codes, with the goal of getting a better understanding of why Goppa codes are so intractable. Our starting point is the work of Faugère, Perret and Portzamparc (Asiacrypt 2014). We take their algebraic model and adapt and improve their attack algorithm so that it can handle BCH-McEliece. We implement the attack and exhibit a parameter range where our attack is practical while generic attacks suggest cryptographic security.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- post-quantum cryptographyMcEliecealgebraic attackBCH-codes
- Contact author(s)
-
freel @ dtu dk
chmaj @ dtu dk - History
- 2023-01-31: last of 2 revisions
- 2022-12-11: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1715
- License
-
CC BY-SA
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1715, author = {Freja Elbro and Christian Majenz}, title = {An Algebraic Attack Against {McEliece}-like Cryptosystems Based on {BCH} Codes}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1715}, year = {2022}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1715} }